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BELIEVE IT OR NOT:
MITIGATING THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS
PERSONAL BELIEF AND BIAS HAVE ON
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Sarah Anne Mourer*
"I know that most men, including those at ease with problems of the
greatest complexity, can seldom accept even the simplest and most
obvious truth ifit be such as would oblige them to admit the falsity of
conclusions which they have delighted in explaining to colleagues,which
they have proudly taught to others, and which they have woven, thread
by thread, into the fabric of their lives."
- Leo Tolstoy'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Anyone who has visited a courtroom or two in Florida may have
noted the inscription on the wall behind the judge. It boldly states: "We
Who Labor Here Seek the Truth." This Article examines both a
prosecutor's and a defense attorney's personal pre-trial beliefs regarding
an accused's guilt or innocence. 2 This analysis suggests that when an
attorney holds pre-trial beliefs, such beliefs lead to avoidable bias and
errors.3 This bias may alter the findings throughout all stages of the case.
* Sarah Mourer is an Associate Professor of Clinical Legal Education at the University of
Miami School of Law. She is the director of the school's Innocence Clinic and Death Penalty
Project. Professor Mourer wishes to thank Don Guerrazzi, Craig Trocino, Meredith Kennedy, Rob
Schehr, Justin Brooks, Keith Findley, Gina Villar, Steve Mourer, Mary Mourer, John Calli, Charlie
Calli, and David Freitas for their support in the writing of this article.
1. JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 38 (Penguin Books 1988) (1987)
(referring to a quote by Leo Tolstoy as interpreted by physicist Joseph Ford).
2. See infra Part I.C; notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Part V. The following excerpt clarifies the meaning of the terms "bias" and
"errors" as used in the article:
Bias is a systematic influence that slants the data in some direction. It is a dangerous form
of error because the influence may be invisible and can lead to a consistent (reliable) but
false picture of the phenomenon being studied. Errors differ from bias in that simple
errors will occur at random, whereas a bias is a systematic error that skews the data.
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The procedure of asking that the prosecution seek justice while
having nothing more than probable cause results in the prosecutor's need
to have a belief in guilt before proceeding to trial. While this belief is
intended to foster integrity and fairness in the criminal justice system, to
the contrary, it actually contributes to wrongful convictions. This Article
closely examines the prosecutor's duty.4 This duty is overwhelming and
obscure. In fact, the prosecutor's duty is so abstruse that, in some ways,
it contradicts itself.5
Specifically, the prosecutor must refrain from prosecuting any
charge that she knows is not supported by probable cause.6 Prosecutors
are also charged with ensuring that the community's faith in the justice
system remains intact. 7 Further, the prosecutor is duty-bound to seek
justice. 8 Although it is important, this duty often proves to be
problematic. These duties, considered together, impose the requirement
that the prosecutor personally evaluate and believe in any charges
brought against citizens, in the name of the State. 9 This gives prosecutors
a quasi-judicial function that runs counter to the purpose of the
adversarial system, which is designed to reveal the truth.'0
Noelie Rodriguez & Alan Ryave, Systematic Self-Observation, in 49 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
METHODS 1, 22 (Heidi Van Middlesworth et al. eds., 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. See infra Part H.A-B.
5. See infra Parts 11,V.
6. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) ("In the ordinary case, 'so long
as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion."' (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978))); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2014) ("The prosecutor in a criminal
case shall ... refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by
probable cause ....).
7. Ross Galin, Note, Above the Law: The Prosecutor's Duty to Seek Justice and the
Performanceof Substantial Assistance Agreements, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1268 (2000) ("As
their representative in the criminal justice system, the prosecutor bears the burden of upholding
public faith in the system.").
8. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (discussing a prosecutor's obligation
to see that justice be done).
9. Michael Q. English, Note, A Prosecutor'sUse of InconsistentFactual Theories of a Crime
in Successive Trials: Zealous Advocacy or a Due Process Violation?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 525,
536-38 (1999).
10. Id. at 529-30. Defense attorneys do not have a duty to believe their clients are innocent.
Defense attorneys must advocate for their clients zealously and to the outermost bounds of the law,
regardless of their feelings about guilt or innocence. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT,
Preamble and Scope paras. 2, 9 (2014) ("As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's
position under the rules of the adversary system."). Yet, on occasion, defense attorneys do develop a
personal belief one way or another. They have no mandate to do so, and their ethical obligations are
to defend their clients to the outermost bounds of the law irrespective of any personal beliefs. See
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEF. FUNCTION 4-4.1, 4-4.1

cmt. at 182 (1993); Phyllis E. Mann, Ethical Obligations of Indigent Defense Attorneys to Their
Clients, 75 Mo. L. REV. 715, 732-35 (2010). The same problems can occur for defense attorneys at
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When an attorney develops a personal belief in a defendant's guilt
or innocence while investigating the merits of the case, facts and
evidence discovered during the investigation will tend to be viewed and
interpreted through the veil of the attorney's personal belief." When a
personal belief is held, a preference for that belief is present. As a result,
decision-making and investigation may be conducted in a biased manner.
Studies show that after adopting a firm personal belief, all facts and
evidence will be filtered through that belief, and any information that
seems to contradict that belief will either be filtered out or reassembled
in a manner that conforms to the belief.12 Consequently, it follows that
once a prosecutor or defense attorney acquires a firm opinion regarding
guilt or innocence, the post-belief investigation will become biased in the
direction of that belief. 13 At this point in time, investigative findings are
interpreted using the acquired bias. 14 If the bias tends to support guilt,
most findings will be interpreted under the glare of supporting guilt.
Thus, the bias is expressed in the direction of the belief in guilt.
There are times, then, when the client is innocent and the bias supporting
guilt is incorrect.15 Sadly, this can often result in the conviction of an
innocent person.
It is not known how frequently bias supports the wrong decision; it
is only certain that bias exists and influences decision making in court. 6
Therefore, the prosecutor's directive to seek justice, which requires
the prosecution to personally believe in the defendant's guilt, sometimes
renders the prosecutor's duty to seek justice unattainable other than
by coincidence.

the trial level if they develop a pre-trial belief regarding their client's guilt or innocence. The
outcome of a biased investigation by a trial level defense attorney is highly dependent upon whether
the belief is in innocence or guilt. A belief in innocence resulting in the defense attorney's zealous
advocacy ought to encourage the nature of the justice system. However, a belief in guilt should not
matter to a defense attorney; if it does, it may result in ineffective assistance of counsel.
11. For illustration, see State v. Saintcalle, which explains the phenomenon further:
[W]ell-established psychological tendencies-such as confirmation bias (the tendency to
look for confirmation but not falsification of our hypotheses) and selective information
processing (the tendency to readily accept confirming evidence but devalue contradictory
evidence)-likely entrench attorneys' preexisting biases, including closely held racial
stereotypes and generalizations, and give attorneys false confidence in the effectiveness
of their decisions concerning peremptory challenges.
309 P.3d 326, 364 (Wash. 2013).
12. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 177-84 (1998); Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, First
Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmation Bias, 114 Q. J. ECoN. 37, 42-45 (1999).
13. See Alafair S. Burke, ProsecutorialAgnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 79, 91-96 (2010).
14. See id.at 91-92.
15. Seeid. at92-93.
16. Seeid. at91-96.
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Notably, while the prosecution's ethical standards fail to provide an
explicit and clear requirement for the prosecutor's belief of guilt, the
prosecutor is left with the sole discretion to determine what outcome will
be just. 17 Thus, it logically follows that the prosecutor is left with the
sole discretion to determine the accused's guilt or innocence, whether or
not she obtains any further evidence or bases her conclusion on any
evidence at all. This brand of blind authority invites the prosecutor to
make her decision regarding the accused's guilt based on her conscious
or unconscious preconceptions and prejudices.
The authority of the prosecutor is further bolstered by the relatively
low burden of proof-probable cause-required for the prosecutor to
pursue a criminal charge. 18 Probable cause is amongst the lowest burdens
of proof in the judicial system. 19 It is a far cry from assessing that a
reasonable juror could find evidence of guilt sufficient beyond a
reasonable doubt. If prosecutors were required to have a higher standard
of evidence before proceeding to trial, their discretion would be limited
and the role of their bias diminished.
Many criminal defense attorneys self-impose a requirement to
personally believe that an inmate is innocent before filing a motion for
post-conviction relief.20 For innocence projects, the first prerequisite for
representation is usually that the evidence indicating innocence is
sufficient, such that it would probably result in an acquittal on retrial.2'
In many instances, the second prerequisite is that the innocence project
believes that the inmate is factually innocent.22 This personal belief
standard carries the same risk of interfering with objective investigation
and raises the real possibility that innocent inmates will fail to have their
claims effectively heard. No attorneys, whether defense or prosecution,
nor civil or criminal, indeed no humans, are immune from uncontained
17. See id. at 83-84.
18. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686 (1972) (noting the probable cause standard
required of a grand jury for bringing prosecution).
19. See Burke, supranote 13, at 83.
20.

Daniel S. Medwed, Actual Innocents: Considerations in Selecting Cases for a New

Innocence Project, 81 NEB. L. REv. 1097, 1101 (2003); Ellen Yankiver Suni, Ethical Issues for
Innocence Projects: An Initial Primer, 70 UMKC L. REv. 921, 924-26 (2002) (discussing the

common models and structures of innocence projects). As the following notes, most innocence
projects adopt a "belief-in-innocence" requirement for representation:
Despite the differences between law school innocence projects, however, they tend to share
a common emphasis on ... seeking the release of prisoners whom members of the project
believe to be innocent of the crimes for which they have been convicted and for whom there
are few other alternatives for legal representation ....
Medwed, supra,at 1101.
21. See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 20, at 1122-23 (discussing specific evidence that an
innocence project looks to when gauging innocence claims).
22. See Suni, supranote 20, at 925-26.
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invitations to unconscious preconceptions and stereotypes. Bias in the
justice system is undeniably a cause of wrongful convictions.23 Although
it may not be possible to entirely eliminate bias, steps can be taken
towards its reduction. Bias in the justice system silently makes its way
into the courtroom, attorney investigations, and judicial decision-making
in unintended, but potent, ways. 24
Subjective decision-making exists in every aspect of the law. It is
unavoidable. However, it can be minimized. This Article addresses one
of the ways that bias and error in the judicial system can be diminished.
Additionally, this Article discusses attorney ethical standards and
analyzes the conflicts that arise.26 Finally, this Article proposes a revised,
evidence-based standard, designed to mitigate the effect that bias may
have on an attorney's decision-making.27
II.

PROSECUTORS' ETHICAL STANDARDS

Prosecutors have ill-defined ethical standards, making their legal
obligations highly problematic. Their professional ethical requirements
are not only vague, but also inconsistent. This section reviews some of
the difficulties these standards create.
A.

To Seek Justice

A prosecutor has the most difficult role in the justice system-to
seek justice.2 8 Prosecutors are dubbed "supreme jurors. 29 Ideally,
prosecutors should not only determine if the defendant is guilty, but also
protect the innocent.3 ° State criminal defendants' right to a fair trial,
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, "imposes
on [prosecutors] certain duties consistent with their sovereign obligation
to ensure that justice shall be done in all criminal prosecutions., 3 1 The
tenor of the case law discussing the role of prosecutors makes clear that
prosecutors are held to the highest standard because of their unique
powers and responsibilities.32 Over sixty years ago, the U.S. Supreme

23.

Burke, supra note 13, at 93; see Hugo Adam Bedau, Racism, Wrongful Convictions, and

the Death Penalty, 76 TENN. L. REV. 615, 619 (2009).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See Bedau, supra note 23 at 619; Burke, supranote 13, at 91-98.
See infra text accompanying notes 211-13.
See infra Part VII.
See infra Part IX.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
Burke, supra note 13, at 84-85.
Berger, 295 U.S. at 88; Burke, supranote 13, at 85.
Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1087

Court observed that a prosecutor has responsibilities beyond that of an
advocate and a higher duty to assure that justice is served:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done .... He may prosecute with earnestness
and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
33
means to bring about a just one.

Accordingly, in addition to "fairly present[ing] the evidence and
permit[ting] the jury to come to a fair and impartial verdict, ' 34 a
prosecutor also must "properly function[] in a quasi-judicial capacity
with reference to the accused.., to see that the accused is accorded a
fair and impartial trial., 35 This is a difficult burden.
In short, the prosecutor's role can be boiled down to the following
functions: ascertain the strength of the evidence,36 evaluate whether a
jury is likely to convict the defendant,37 and determine whether there is
anything leading the prosecutor to doubt the evidence and question the
defendant's guilt. 38 In this regard, multiple individualized or situationspecific definitions of justice are unhelpful and confusing. A closer
33. Id.
34. Fla. Barv. Cox, 794 So. 2d 1278, 1285 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Pendarvis v. State, 752 So. 2d
75, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
35. Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 97 So. 2d 127, 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
36. See Burke, supranote 13, at 84.
37. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
ProsecutorsDo Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 50 n.19 (1991) ("[D]oing justice thus requires a
prosecutor to predict the appropriate result.").
38. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEF.
FUNCTION 3-3.9(b)(i) (1993) (indicating that a prosecutor may decline to prosecute a case when she
has a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt despite evidence to support a conviction). This
ABA standard is unclear as to when the public good would be served if a prosecutor possessed
sufficient evidence to convict an individual but declined to prosecute the case. The ABA standard
reads:
The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public
interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which
would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly
consider in exercising his or her discretion are. . . the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that
the accused is in fact guilty ....
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appraisal reveals that a uniform definition of justice is required if a
prosecutor is to be entrusted to ensure that justice is done. Perhaps it is
not as simple as convicting the guilty of the crime charged or dropping
the charges if the prosecutor has doubts regarding the accused's guilt.
"Justice" has been defined in the following ways: "the quality of being
just, impartial, or fair;" "the principle or ideal of just dealing 39or right
law.",
action;" "righteousness;" and "the quality of conforming to
Reflection on these meanings makes apparent that justice in any
given situation is anything but clear. What is just, moral, or right is
inevitably dependent on the personal values of those deciding the
outcomes. Justice cannot accompany a bright line rule. A theory of
justice that solely encompasses conviction for the guilty and release for
the innocent ignores meaningful concepts such as mercy, rehabilitation,
proportionality, individuality, and spirituality. 40 Among judges and
scholars there is no uniformity as to what it means for a prosecutor to
seek justice.41 It is opined by some that the duty to seek justice is not
overly complicated because principles of justice generally overlap the
standards of constitutional fairness and due process.42 Others maintain
that to do justice is wholly dependent on the individual prosecutor's
sense of morality and personal value system. 43 The textbook definition of
44
"justice" inherently involves an element of "being correct" or "right."
This means, simply, that the outcome of the trial should be consistent
with the actual facts. Therefore, if the verdict is consistent with the facts,
justice will have been achieved. Consequently, for a prosecutor to
determine what would be a just outcome, the prosecutor must first
determine what is "correct" or "right." Thus, in the context of the
criminal justice system at the trial level, the prosecutor is placed in the
position of deciding whether the defendant is guilty before evidence is
presented.45 If the ethical obligation of the prosecution is to seek justice,
this includes seeking appropriate punishment and determining if
proceeding to trial is morally correct. 46 Without relying on an evidentiary
39.

Justice, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/justice

(last

visited Sept. 2, 2015).
40.

Ruth Kannai, PreservingProportionalityin Sentencing: Constitutionalor CriminalIssue,

9 CANADIAN CRIM. L. REv. 315,325-28 (2005).
41. Zacharias, supra note 37, at 48 ("The 'do justice' standard, however, establishes no
identifiable norm.").
42.

See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.

607,634 (1999).
43.

See George T. Frampton, Jr., Some Practicaland EthicalProblems of ProsecutingPublic

Officials, 36 MD. L. REv. 5, 8 (1976).
44.

See Justice, supra note 39.

45.
46.

Burke, supranote 13, at 84-85.
Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standardfor the Prosecutor'sExercise of the Charging
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standard appropriate to convict an individual at trial, one cannot make
such decisions without making a personal judgment regarding the guilt
of the accused.
To make matters more complex, appended to prosecutors'
obligation to do justice is the duty to uphold public faith in the judicial
system.47 Consequently, coupled with the duty to do justice, the
prosecutor must consider public opinion, due process, and general issues
of faimess. 48 As will be discussed below, the public's faith in the justice
system has little to do with justice.49 In part, this is a result of the fluid
and individualized nature of justice. Community consensus invariably
differs with regard to whether particular outcomes are just or fair.
Attempts to reconcile public opinion with just outcomes are futile and
would hinder a prosecutor's ability to seek fair and equitable results.
Thus, the prosecutor's ethical obligations are nearly insurmountable.
B. A Prosecutor'sCase Must Be Supported by ProbableCause
Pursuant to Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
"[t]he prosecutor in a criminal case shall ... refrain from prosecuting a
charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
",'In addition to the belief intrinsically required in seeking
cause. ....
justice, the definition of "probable cause" also logically includes a
personal belief in guilt: "The requisites of probable cause for [the]
prosecution are: (1) accuser must believe accused did the act charged;
and (2) such belief must be reasonable ....""Additionally, "probable
cause" is defined as "such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as
would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or
entertain 52an honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested
is guilty.
Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 524 (1993).
47. Galin, supranote 7, at 1268.
48.

See id. at 1269-70.

49. See infra Part V11I.
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2014); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEF. FUNCTION 3-3.9(a) (1993) ("A prosecutor
should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges

when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause.").
51.

Johnston v. Zale Corp., 484 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Tenn. 1972) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Dunn v. Ala. Oil & Gas Co., 299 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956) (emphasis
added)); see Burke, supra note 13, at 84-86.
52. Birwood Paper Co. v. Damsky, 229 So. 2d 514, 521 (Ala. 1969) (quoting Hanchey v.

Brunson, 175 Ala. 236, 240 (1911)); see also Hyman v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 147 N.E. 613, 615
(N.Y. 1925) ("Probable cause consists of such facts and circumstances as would have led a
reasonably prudent man in like circumstances to have believed the plaintiff guilty of an intent to
violate the law.").
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The probable cause standard serves as the criteria that must be met
to begin several stages of a criminal case: police detention; police search;
arrest; incarceration resulting from a bond hearing; incarceration
resulting from an adversary preliminary hearing; prosecutorial filing of
charges; and prosecutorial progression to trial.53 Each of these stages
involves substantially different degrees of intrusion into a defendant's
privacy and risks of wrongful incarceration or conviction.54 Yet, the
standard remains the same for each.
The probable cause standard is one of the lowest standards in
criminal law.55 At a bond hearing, adequate probable cause can be found
if the arrest affidavit contains a narrative with facts sufficient to support
each element of the crime alleged on the arrest affidavit. 56 Arrest forms
are usually only one page long, and are very rarely longer than two or
three pages. 57 The arrest affidavit, which serves as the sole support to
hold an accused in jail while the case is investigated, 58 is written prior to
any investigation by the prosecutor's office.59 If the arrest form does not
reflect one of the elements of the crime charged, the case may be
53. See, e.g., Brett Hambright, Supreme Court: Pennsylvania Cops No Longer Need a
Warrant to Search Citizens' Vehicles, LANCASTERONLINE (Apr. 30, 2014, 10:55 AM)
http://lancasteronline.com/news/locaU/supreme-court-pennsylvania-cops-no-longer-need-a-warrantto/article_6a407fc6-d077-1e3-8025-0017a43b2370.html; Fiona Ortiz, Illinois Wife-Killer Cop
3,
2015),
(Mar.
Pleads Not
Guilty
in
Murder-For-Hire Plot, REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/03/us-usa-illinois-crime-idUSKBNOLZ2FI20150303.
Collection Is
Supreme
Court Thinks
DNA
54. Compare Kashmir
Hill,
Awesome, Worth the Invasion of Arrestees' Privacy, FORBES (June 3, 2013, 6:30
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/06/03/supreme-court-thinks-dna-collection-is(discussing the Supreme Court's decision
awesome-worth-the-invasion-of-arrestees-privacy
upholding the constitutionality of a Maryland statute authorizing DNA collection from all felony
arrestees), with James C. McKinley, Facebook Lawsuit Over Search Warrants Can Proceed, a
Court in Manhattan Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2014, at A24 (discussing a lawsuit filed by
Facebook against the Manhattan district attorney's office opposing warrants authorizing the officials
to search personal profiles of Facebook users).
55. See Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339, 348 (1813) ("[T]he term 'probable cause,'
according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify
condemnation ... ").
56. See 5 AM. JUR. 2DArrest § 19 (2007).
57. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(b)(l) (describing what is required for a federal arrest warrant); 10A
AM. JUR. PLEADING AND PRACTICE FORMS False Imprisonment § 70 (2005) (explaining when an
arrest form is fair on its face). Arizona's standard arrest warrant constitutes a perfect example of
what is usually required within an arrest form. ARIz. R. CRIM. PROC. 41, form 2(a) (2015).
58. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(b)(1); 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 19 (2007) ("An affidavit supporting
an arrest warrant must provide the magistrate with sufficient information to support an independent
judgment that probable cause exists to believe that the accused has committed an offense .... ").
59. See 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 19 (2007). This is true for the majority of state cases, but does
not include federal cases where the U.S. Attorney may become involved at a much earlier time. See,
e.g., U.S. Attorney's Office N. Dist. of Ga., Criminal Division, JUSTICE.GOV,
http://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (discussing how the U.S. Attorneys
investigate and prosecute cases).
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continued for up to thirty days for the arresting officer to appear in court
to testify to the elements of the crime.60 This hearing is known as an
adversarial preliminary hearing ("APH"). 6' The witnesses in an APH are
subject to cross-examination, 62 and the accused may be incarcerated if
mere probable cause is found.63 There is no requirement for the
prosecutor to believe that the accused is guilty at this stage of the
proceedings. In fact, the prosecutor generally will not have any
knowledge about the case at this time; therefore, a belief in the
defendant's guilt would be unfounded at this stage of the proceedings.
This is because the prosecutor who attends the APH is usually a different
prosecutor than the one who initially takes the witnesses' statements
(termed "pre-file statements") when the case first arrives at the
prosecutors' office. This intake prosecutor also determines if and what
charges will be filed. The "pre-file" prosecutor transfers the case to the
trial attorney once she completes taking witness statements and makes
her filing decision.
The legal definition of "probable cause" remains the same for each
prosecutor and for each stage of the case, as there is no legal authority
stating otherwise. Although it is clear that the prosecutor must believe
that the defendant is guilty to proceed to trial,64 it appears that this
requirement is either ignored by the prosecutor until the time of trial, or
the belief-in-guilt concept is imputed from the arresting officer at the
time of arrest. 65 This leaves unanswered the role of belief-in-guilt in the
equation at bond hearings, pre-trial hearings, and at any stage before the
prosecution has had an adequate opportunity to appraise a defendant's
culpability through discovery and investigation. Although the evidence
to arrest is minimal, no further evidence is required to proceed to seek a
conviction.6 6 Thus, although the definition of probable cause remains the
same, there appears to be some ambiguity in its application and
interpretation depending on the stage of the proceedings. Given that
prosecutors' ethical duties include seeking justice, it is counter-intuitive

60. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.133(b), 3.134. For example, if on a grand theft charge, the officer
did not include the value of the property, then the arrest form would lack probable cause because the
element of value is missing.
61. Seeid. at3.133(b)(1).
62. See id. at3.133(b)(3).
63. See id. at 3.133(b)(5). This is only true if the judge does not use her discretion and grant
pre-trial release or bond. The adversaries may also reach an agreement regarding the accused's
release. Id.
64. See Gershman, supra note 46, at 522.
65. Leonard R. Mellon et al., The Prosecutor Constrainedby His Environment: A New Look
at DiscretionaryJusticein the UnitedStates, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 73 (1981).
66. Id.
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to conclude that the prosecution could ethically proceed to prosecute
without a higher evidentiary standard than probable cause.
C. Value of the Prosecution'sPersonalBelief Standard
As the current ethical obligations stand, a personal belief
requirement for prosecutors does serve a valuable function. There are a
variety of situations where a prosecutor may have enough evidence to
prove guilt, but does not have a personal belief in guilt. The process of
seeking justice requires the belief in guilt at some point prior to the filing
of charges and bringing an accused to trial.
For example, prosecutors may overhear police officers make
comments that lead them to question the defendant's guilt or otherwise
become privy to information that indicates the defendant is innocent. For
the most part, the prosecution's obligations established under Brady v.
Maryland 7 and Giglio v. United States68 should remedy these situations.
Brady and Giglio impose on the prosecution a duty to learn and disclose
to the defense all "favorable" and "material" information "known to the
others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the
police., 69 Brady endorses the role of the prosecutor as a seeker of justice,
67. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
68. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
69. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995); Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150; Brady, 373 U.S.
at 87. In Brady v. Maryland, Brady had confessed to murder, but argued that he should not get the
death penalty because he did not perform the actual killing. 373 U.S. at 84. The Government did not
disclose to Brady that the co-defendant admitted to performing the killing. Id.The Court found that
"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution." Id.at 87. It is often overlooked that the Court employed a fairly
lenient materiality standard in Brady. See Daniel S. Medwed, Brady's Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1533, 1543-44 (2010). The suppressed confession by the co-defendant also stated that
Brady likewise wanted to kill the victim, but that Brady wanted to strangle the victim and the codefendant wanted to shoot him. Brady, 373 U.S. at 88. Even so, the Court held that the confession
would have been favorable to Brady and found a due process violation. Id. at 86.
In Giglio v. United States, a key witness testified that he and Mr. Giglio forged $2300 in
money orders, and the witness believed he "still could be prosecuted." 405 U.S. at 151. The
government argued in closing that the witness "received no promises that he would not be indicted."
Id. at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted). But, in fact, the grand jury prosecutor had,
unbeknownst to the trial prosecutor, promised the witness that, if he testified before the grand jury,
he would not be indicted. Id.The trial prosecutor denied any knowledge of the promise and, thus,
denied any knowing use of false testimony. Id.at 152-53. The Court clarified that the Brady
disclosure obligation does not turn on the trial prosecutor's actual knowledge of the information. Id.
at 154-55. The Court imputed the promise of the first prosecutor to the entire office, holding that the
burden should be placed on the Government to develop procedures to ensure that "all relevant
information" is communicated to each lawyer who handles any case. Id.The Court explained that
"[wlhen the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,
nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [Brady]." Id.at 154 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court further expounded that reversal under Brady requires a finding of
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stating: "Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when
criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers
when any accused is treated unfairly." 70 Brady affirmed that a prosecutor
should not be the "architect of a proceeding that does not comport with
standards ofjustice. '7
However, not every situation where a prosecutor is aware of
information that points to innocence falls under Brady or Giglio. For
example, imagine that a prosecutor interviews the arresting officer on a
drug case and the officer recounts the exact same facts as he did in the
last two drug cases. The officer may describe the details of the case so
similarly to the previous two drug cases that the prosecutor is led to the
conclusion that the officer is not truthful. However, her personal opinion
that the officer is lying is not likely to fall under Brady, or even Giglio.7 2
If the prosecutor were held to a belief-in-guilt standard, she would be
obligated to cease prosecuting the case. Without the personal belief
standard, she would be free to proceed with the prosecution. This
example epitomizes the purpose of the belief-in-guilt standard. However,
this benefit fails to mitigate the damage done by the bias the belief
standard may cause in the investigation and decision-making process.
Furthermore, in the real world, prosecutors routinely focus on obtaining
high conviction rates, seeking promotions, receiving raises, and
cultivating good reputations.73 Additionally, many prosecutors believe
that a high conviction rate is synonymous with justice and satisfies the
community's demand for convictions.74
D. ProsecutorsFailto Adhere to Their Ethical Standards
For a variety of reasons, prosecutors often do not abide by the
above discussed ethical requirements. This is not surprising given the
complexities of the requirements. Furthermore, prosecutors experience a

materiality (though what "materiality" means will evolve), which is defined as a showing that the
withheld evidence could "in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury." Id.
70. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
71. Id. at 88.
72. See Medwed, supra note 69, at 1541-42.
73. See Zacharias, supra note 37, at 58-60.
74. See M. Victoria Cole, How Can You Sleep at Night?: Leaving a Prosecution Practicefor
Private Defense Work, in TRANSITIONING FROM PROSECUTOR TO DEFENSE ATTORNEY: LEADING
LAWYERS ON ESSENTIAL STRATEGIES FOR CONSIDERING AND ADAPTING TO A NEW PROFESSIONAL

PERSPECTIVE 125, 137 (2012) ("As a prosecutor, I used to measure my success by rate of
conviction."); see also Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 443, 454 (2005) ("[Study]
results... suggested higher conviction rates when participants believed they were participating in a
real trial .... ).
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number of compelling
ethical guidelines.

incentives

to not

strictly follow

their

1. Prosecutorial Incentive to Obtain Convictions
Given that prosecutors are not provided adequate ethical guidelines,
evidentiary or otherwise, it becomes too easy for prosecutors to neglect
75
their duty to do justice by genuinely believing in the defendant's guilt.
Personal conflict, ethical dilemmas, and moral questions stem from the
personal belief standard. Since prosecutors have many incentives to
proceed with trials and to seek convictions, this route is more
comfortable for many prosecutors and comports with some aspects of
their ethical obligations.7 6 They are compelled by community and intraoffice pressures to obtain convictions,77 and they are motivated by the
status, reputation, and personal feelings of success that come along with
a high conviction rate.78 Further, prosecutors are not commended for
dropping cases, even when guilt is in question. 79 As discussed above,
justice is an imprecise concept and highly individualized for each
particular case and defendant. 80 How well a prosecutor obtains justice,
and performs fairly and ethically, is difficult to gauge. Conviction rate,
however, is a quantifiable aspect of trial work. Somebody wins and
somebody loses. In fact, the only quantifiable measure that a prosecutor
can point to that can demonstrate her success is her conviction rate. It is
logical, then, that an individual prosecutor, as well as her supervisors,
will measure her success by her conviction rate. However, pursuit of a
high rate of conviction as the top priority is in violation of the
prosecutor's obligation to seek justice. 1 Often, justice will not involve a
conviction. To only pursue convictions leaves justice unaddressed.
Nevertheless, a high conviction rate is likely to impress the public and
indicate an efficient and effective prosecutor.8 2
75. See Burke, supra note 13, at 83-84; Rachel Pecker, Note, Quasi-JudicialProsecutorsand
Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence: Granting Recusals to Make Impartiality a Reality, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1609, 1621, 1635 (2013).
76. See Burke, supra note 13, at 84-86; Zacharias, supra note 37, at 58-59.
77. Deborah Mostaghel, Wrongfully Incarcerated,Randomly Compensated-How to Fund
Wrongful-Conviction Compensation Statutes, 44 IND. L. REV. 503, 506 (2011); Pecker, supra note
75, at 1617-18; Zacharias, supra note 37, at 58-59.
78. See Cole, supra note 74, at 137; Zacharias, supra note 37, at 58 n.63 ("For elected
prosecutors, publicity about trial successes is essential to campaigns. For subordinato [sic]
prosecutors in larger offices, promotion and internal evaluation depends largely on the ability to
produce convictions.").
79. See Pecker, supra note 75, at 1618.
80. See supra Part II.A.
81. See Mostaghel, supranote 77, at 506; Zacharias, supranote 37, at 58-59.
82. See Mostaghel, supranote 77, at 506. Not only do convictions generally gratify the public
but they satisfy the senior staff attorneys and supervisors:
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Public attitude in the United States reflects a desire for the criminal
justice system to be "tough on crime" and for prosecutors to secure many
convictions and harsh, lengthy prison sentences. Given that part of the
prosecutor's role is to sustain the public's faith in the criminal justice
system, methods that result in high conviction rates are likely to satisfy
this obligation. Such a policy, although rewarding for the prosecutor,
clearly ignores the requirements of justice.
It is no surprise that prosecutors simply seek convictions.
Prosecutors are given a set of ethical rules and guidelines that are not
only in opposition to each other, but unmanageable. First, prosecutors
are expected to assess probable cause despite its unclear definition.84
Second, they are expected to seek justice when the tools to ascertain a
just result are not available to them prior to trial. Third, they are
expected to maintain public confidence in the criminal justice system.8 6
Fourth, their superiors assess their performance based on the number of
convictions they secure.87 These mandates conflict with one another; to
accomplish all four is simply not possible. As a practical matter,
prosecutors have no choice but to concern themselves with job security,
performance reviews, and promotions. Hence, prosecutors most often
choose to seek the conviction.
In fact, prosecutors with higher conviction rates advance more
quickly financially and to more prestigious positions within the office.

[[]ncentives within the prosecutorial system may influence prosecutors to obtain
convictions. Individually, prosecutors with high conviction rates are more likely to
advance on the job and so may overzealously pursue easy targets. Institutionally, district
attorneys who show high conviction rates may be able to gamer more resources than
those who seem to be less successful.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
83. Jamien A. Arvie, Prosecutorial Misconduct: When Justice Is Seen as a Chess Game, the
Pawns of ProfessionalResponsibility and Ethical Standards Are Sacrificed, 40 S.U. L. REV. 185,
189 (2012) ("Today, the district attorney, an elected official, is usually faced with pressure from the
public for high conviction rates and 'tough on crime' political platforms."); Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr.,
How Can You Defend Those People?, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 39,40 (1996).
84. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) ("In the ordinary case, 'so long
as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion."' (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978))).
85. See Green, supra note 42, at 615-16. The adversarial system is the means by which justice
is ascertained and the method by which truth should be revealed. The prosecutor's mandate to seek
justice would require the prosecutor to find and to know the truth in advance of the established truth
finding procedure-the trial.
86. Galin, supranote 7, at 1268.
87. Mostaghel, supra note 77, at 506; see Sabrina C. Narain, A Failure to Instill Realistic
Ethical Values in New Lawyers: The ABA and Law School's Duty to Better Prepare Lawyers for
Real Life Practice, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 411,422-24 (2014).
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These prosecutors also gain more respect from both their seniors and the
newer prosecutors. Not only do prosecutors with higher conviction rates
obtain promotions more rapidly, but due to their superior professional
statuses, they also have better access to coveted resources, such as
investigators, experts, and funding. Given the substantial pressures to
obtain convictions, prosecutors' offices typically acquire a conviction
psychology, such that it has become difficult for defense attorneys to
discuss with prosecutors alternative resolutions to trial because defense
attorneys have internalized the view that the prosecutor must be
uncompromising and conviction-oriented.
2. Prosecutorial Charging Methods Reflect the Prosecutor's Lack
of Belief in the Defendant's Guilt
Generally, once an arrest is made, the prosecutor's office begins the
process of determining whether charges will be filed. 88 Typically, this
involves interviewing the police and witnesses in what is often known as
pre-file conferences. 89 Charging decisions are most often based on these
interviews. In larger cities, the prosecutor who conducts the pre-file
investigation is rarely the same as the trial prosecutor. 9° As a
consequence of this procedure, many prosecutors who first obtain
responsibility for a case at the trial level make the assumption that the
police and previous prosecutors already assessed the defendant's guilt
and strength of the evidence. 91
A review of generally accepted prosecutorial practices would lead
one to infer that prosecutors are indeed focused on obtaining a
conviction irrespective of the accused's factual culpability. For example,

88.

See Burke, supra note 13, at 86-87; see also Standard Practices - Prosecutorial

Processing
Introduction,
N.Y.
ST.
DIVISION
CRIM.
JUST.
SERVICES,
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/stdpractices/prosec.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (outlining the
prosecutorial process for New York state prosecutors).
89.

See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL

JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEF.

FUNCTION 3-3.1 (1993); see also Steps in a Criminal Case, MONROE COUNTY,
http://www.co.monroe.mi.us/government/departments-Offices/prosecuting-attomey/steps -in-a-pro
secution.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (demonstrating how a typical investigation process will
proceed).0
90. See Burke, supra note 13, at 98 & n.95 ("In many prosecutors' offices, initial charging
decisions are made by different attorneys than the prosecutors who are responsible for case
management and trial."); see also James C. Backstrom & Gary L. Walker, The Role of the
Prosecutorin Juvenile Justice: Advocacy in the Courtroom and Leadership in the Community, 32
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 963, 967-68 (2006) (discussing the benefits of assigning the same
prosecutor from an initial charging through disposition and the unlikelihood of this occurrence in
larger jurisdictions).
91. Burke, supranote 13, at 98 n.95; George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor:A Look at Reality,
7 Sw. U. L. REV. 98, 112 (1975).
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prosecutors routinely overcharge defendants. 92 Overcharging is when a
prosecutor is confident that the accused committed a crime, but charges
the accused with a more serious crime. 93 The crime that the prosecutor is
convinced that the defendant committed is presented to the jury as a
"lesser-included offense." 94 In this manner, a prosecutor can attempt to
obtain a conviction for a more serious crime, although she harbors
doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence.
Prosecutors also regularly charge defendants with multiple
inconsistent charges.95 This can occur, for example, if a defendant is
arrested in possession of a stolen boat. Assume the prosecution not only
has evidence that the defendant stole the boat (grand theft), but also
evidence that the defendant bought the boat knowing it was stolen
(dealing in stolen property), instead of stealing it himself. As a
consequence, the prosecution might charge the defendant with
inconsistent charges by charging the accused with both grand theft and
dealing in stolen property. This is true even though it is impossible for
the defendant to be factually or legally guilty of both charges with these
particular facts.
Similarly, prosecutors frequently present the jury with inconsistent
theories.96 When the prosecution chooses to prosecute inconsistent
theories or charges, usually in cases with co-defendants, it demonstrates
that the prosecution lacks a subjective belief in at least one of the
theories. This tends to be true when the theories are in tension with each
other, and must be true when the theories are mutually exclusive.97 For
instance, if a husband and wife are both charged with the death of their
92. Burke, supra note 13, at 86-87; Felkenes, supra note 91, at 119.
93. Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701,703-05 (2014).
94. Burke, supranote 13, at 86-87; Graham, supra note 93, at 701, 703-05. A "lesser-included

offense" is "an offense necessarily included in the offense charged." FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(c)(1); 22
MICHAEL E. ALLEN, 22 WEST's FLORIDA PRACTICE SERIES: FLORIDA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 753-

54 (2009 ed.) ("[F]or example, [] simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor.., is a necessarily
lesser included offense of aggravated battery, a second degree felony .... (footnotes omitted)); see
Burke, supra note 13, at 86. The following represents a common example of prosecutorial
overcharging where the prosecutor likely is not convinced that justice would be served if the
defendant was found guilty of an Aggravated Assault as opposed to a Simple Assault:
In an assault case in which the defendant struck the victim's head against a wall, the
prosecutor might charge the defendant with two levels of assault: a more serious charge
on the theory that the wall, as used, constituted a "weapon," and also a lesser-included
offense that does not require use of a weapon.
Burke, supra note 13, at 86.

95. Burke, supranote 13, at 87-88.
96. Id.; English, supra note 9, at 542-43.
97. Brandon Buskey, If the Convictions Don't Fit, You Must Acquit: Examining the
ConstitutionalLimitations on the State's Pursuit of Inconsistent Criminal Prosecutions, 36 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 311, 314 (2012); see, e.g., Bankhead v. State, 182 S.W.3d 253, 254, 259
(Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
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child by beating the child to death, causation becomes an issue. In such a
case, the wife and the husband will likely have separate jury trials.
During the wife's trial, prosecutors may place responsibility for the fatal
injury on the wife. Conversely, and inconsistently, at the husband's trial,
the prosecution may place responsibility for the fatal injury on the
husband. Generally, other than in limited circumstances, a prosecutor
may not present evidence wholly contrary to evidence presented in
another proceeding. To do so is unconstitutional.98 Plainly, the
prosecutor does not embrace a belief in guilt regarding at least one of the
parents. However, such a prosecutor may be comfortable with these trial
tactics given her concept of justice in that particular case. This may be
true if she feels that both parents morally deserve the punitive outcomes
that would likely result from the most serious convictions. As discussed,
justice may differ by individual, by jury, by judge, and by community.
Justice, as a theory embracing truth and fairness, more often than not
provides moral quandaries and predicaments. It is for this reason that
our culture created procedures and policies to support the criminal
justice system.
Although justice is flawed, at best, if its administrators would
respect and abide by its procedural imperatives, the country would suffer
far fewer injustices. It is far too easy to side-step the appropriate process
in the name of justice. Prosecutorial belief in guilt and a personal version
of justice often results in a disregard for the means to reach a "just"
end.99 Although, in specific circumstances, it is legal for the prosecution
to provide incentives to individuals in exchange for their testimony
against the accused.' ° These witnesses are commonly referred to as
98. See, e.g., Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1479 (11th Cir. 1985) (Clark, J., concurring). In
Drake v. Kemp, the State sent Drake to death row after disavowing the theory used to condemn his
co-defendant Campbell in a previous trial. Id. at 1452, 1479. The Eleventh Circuit found that the
prosecution's argument was an improper tactic. Id.at 1458-59. In his special concurring opinion,
Judge Clark said that the prosecutorial inconsistency implicated the defendant's due process,
invoking the prohibition against a prosecutor's soliciting or failing to correct evidence known by the
State to be false. Id.at 1479. Judge Clark reasoned that the prosecutor's "theories of the same crime
in the two different trials negate one another." Id.While acknowledging that the prosecutor's actual
beliefs were impossible to discern, Judge Clark charged that the prosecutor's incompatible positions
required the State's endorsement of a known falsity. Id. Addressing prejudice, Judge Clark
concluded that the prosecutor's actions prejudiced both defendants, since the State's "flip flopping
of theories" resulted in both convictions and death sentences for both men. Id.
99. See supra Parts ll.A, LI.D.1.
100. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1298-99, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 1999); Saul
Levmore & Ariel Porat, Asymmetries and Incentives in Plea Bargaining and Evidence Production,
122 YALE L.J. 690, 692-93 (2012). Some such incentives are as follows:
[T]he government-but not the defense-is able to reward witnesses in criminal cases
with certain nonmonetary inducements, including agreements to seek reduced penalties,
or even not to prosecute at all in both related and unrelated cases. If a witness is already
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"snitches."' 0 1 In multiple-defendant cases, prosecutors often offer several
of the defendants very low plea deals in exchange for their testimony
against the other defendants. 10 2 Often, snitches may do no jail time at all,
even on serious offenses such as murder. 10 3 Sometimes, the prosecution
will recruit whoever is willing to "flip" on their co-defendant. 10 4 Often,
the prosecution targets a particular individual to prosecute and actively
seeks snitches to testify against him.' °5 At times, it is clear why a
particular defendant is the target; but quite often, it is a mystery why a
particular individual is the focus of the prosecution. Further, it is not
unusual for a defendant to be convicted of a serious offense, even
murder, based solely on the testimony of snitches. 10 6 This can be true
even when the snitches themselves have admittedly committed multiple
murders and have lengthy records, while the accused may have little to
no record at all. 10 7 It is exceedingly difficult to accept that prosecutors
hold personal the beliefs based on evidence that the defendants in these
circumstances are guilty.
III.

DEFENSE ATTORNEYS' ETHICAL STANDARDS

Defense attorneys, on the other hand, have the ethical responsibility
to zealously advocate for their clients to the outermost bounds of the
law. 10 8 This is true at all stages of a criminal prosecution, from pre-trial
hearing through post-conviction

°9

In contrast to a prosecutor's ethical

incarcerated, the government can offer to improve the conditions of confinement.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
101. Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful
Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 107,107 &n.1, 110-11(2006).
102. See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1301-02 (holding that the government may exchange leniency
for testimony against a co-defendant).
103. Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 563, 578 (1999); see
also David Rennie, Hoover Let FBI's Mafia Snitches Get Away with Murder,TELEGRAPH (Nov. 22,
2003, 12:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1447439/Hooverlet-FBIs-Mafia-snitches-get-away-with-murder.hnml
(recounting reports of allowing mafia
informants lie on the witness stand about circumstances surrounding murders).
104. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1328-29 (2003). A
defendant "flips" when he "defects" and agrees to testify for the government, in exchange for
leniency in sentencing, against his codefendant, usually implicating himself in the process. See id.
105. See id.
at 1395 n.325.
106. Aaron Cant6, Ring of Snitches: How Detroit Police Slapped False Murder Convictions on
Young Black Men, TRUTH-OUT (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/29950-ring-ofsnitches-how-detroit-police-slapped-false-murder-convictions-on-young-black-men.
107. See Natapoff, supra note 101, at 110-12, 125-26; Rennie, supranote 103.
108. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope para. 2 (2014); Mann,
supra note 10, at 732-35; see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION & DEF. FUNCTION 4-1.2, 4-1.2 cmt. at 122 (1993).
109. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope paras. 2, 9 (2014).
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obligations, a defense attorney's ethical mandate does not require
judgment of her client's guilt or innocence. 1 l The defense attorney,
therefore, enjoys a much more straightforward duty. Despite the defense
attorney's unambiguous objective, defense attorneys are human and are,
thus, subject to the same natural predispositions as prosecutors. The
defense attorney should not reach conclusions regarding her client's guilt
or concern herself with the prisoner's culpability beyond what is
necessary for a full investigation of the case."' Nonetheless, it is natural
for the defense attorney to speculate regarding her client's guilt and even
develop firm beliefs regarding his guilt. Such a personally held belief in
guilt risks the inadvertent or unconscious failure of the defense attorney
to represent the client with enthusiasm and diligence."12 This is true
because pre-trial beliefs represent firm and fixed biases, and these beliefs
may be inconsistent with the facts.
A. Innocence Programs
At the post-conviction stage, specifically within innocence
programs, defense attorneys regularly and voluntarily adopt a "belief-ininnocence" standard. 113 These innocence programs are limited
representation agencies-meaning the programs will only represent or
continue to represent the client as long as the client maintains his
innocence and the evidence continues to support innocence.' 14 The vast
majority of innocence projects also require that they believe the inmate is
innocent. 15 Innocence programs often choose to adopt a belief-ininnocence criterion in order to assure that their limited resources are
110.

See ABA

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION

FUNCTION & DEF.

FUNCTION 4-1.2 (1993) ("The basic duty defense counsel owes to the administration ofjustice and
as an officer of the court is to serve as the accused's counselor and advocate with courage and
devotion and to render effective, quality representation.").
111. See Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, CareAbout Innocence,
50 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 63 (2010). Defense attorneys should understand "guilty" and
"innocent" to be legal terms, as opposed to a measure of moral aptitude. See Terence F. MacCarthy
& Kathy Morris Mejia, The PerjuriousClient Question: PuttingCriminal Defense Lawyers Between
a Rock and a Hard Place, 75 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1197, 1197 n.1 (1984); see also F.
Randall Karfonta, Balancing the Scales of Justice: Training and Support Services for Appointed
Criminal Defense Lawyers, MICH. B.J., Feb. 1992, at 164, 164 ("For the criminal defense lawyer,
zealous advocacy means vigorous investigation of every viable line of defense and equally vigorous
presentation of defenses and mitigating circumstances.").
112. Mosteller, supranote 111, at 62-64.
113. Medwed, supranote 20, at 1101, 1103-04; Suni, supranote 20, at 924-26.
114. Medwed, supranote 20, at 1103-04; Suni, supra note 20, at 929.
115. See Medwed, supranote 20, at 1101, 1103-05; Jan Stiglitz et al., The HurricaneMeets the
PaperChase: Innocence Projects New Emerging Role in Clinical Legal Education, 38 CAL. W. L.
REV. 413, 431 (2002) ("In screening each file, the students have to make two determinations: do
they believe the client is innocent and can they prove it?"); Suni, supranote 20, at 924-26.
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devoted to the most deserving of clients. 16 Further, the belief-ininnocence mandate is often more appealing to potential donors and on
grant applications.' 17 Nonetheless, even if an innocence organization
maintains that representation is contingent on the organization's belief in
the client's innocence, the ethical and discovery obligations of the
defense remain the same.
B. Assessing the Value of a Defense Attorney's Post-Conviction
Belief-in-Innocence Standard
On its face, the belief-in-innocence standard has greater import for
an innocence clinic. The defense attorney is not bound by the Brady or
Giglio duty. 8 Thus, if the defense attorney uncovers incriminating
evidence, she is under no obligation to disclose this information to the
prosecution.'9 In fact, if she did, she would in most instances violate her
ethical duties. 120 Yet, innocence programs fully expect to encounter
incriminating evidence. Their clients have already been convicted of the
crime, and therefore, there was necessarily incriminating evidence
presented to the jury at trial. By claiming innocence, innocence program
clients are often claiming the incriminating evidence from trial was false
or flawed. 121 Often, the clients are claiming that exculpatory evidence
was not developed or presented. 122
Frequently, during an innocence program's investigation of a case,
only additional incriminating evidence will be uncovered. 123 Since most

116. Medwed, supranote 20, at 1103-05.
117. Id. at 1105-06; Suni, supranote 20, at 929 n.38.
118. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (accentuating the responsibilities of
a prosecution office because it is a government entity); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)
("[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution." (emphasis added)).
119. Lisa M. Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69
FORDHAM L. REv. 1205, 1207, 1212 n.55 (2000).
120. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a)-(b) (2014); Kurcias, supra note 119, at
1212 n.5 ("[T]he defense attorney is entitled, and may be professionally bound, to withhold material
evidence .. ") (quoting MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 214 (1st ed.
1990)).
121. See Aviva Orenstein, Facing the Unfaceable: Dealing with ProsecutorialDenial in
Postconviction Cases of Actual Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 401, 437-40 (2011); The Causes
of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongfulconviction (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (discussing the common causes for wrongful convictions such
as eyewitness identifications, false confessions or admissions, forensic science, and informants).
122. See Orenstein, supranote 121, at 426-27, 437-38.
123.

See

Frequently

Asked

Questions,

MID-ATLANTIC

http://www.exonerate.org/contact/request-help/frequently-asked-questions
2015).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss4/5
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innocence programs are limited representation programs, they are under
no obligation to proceed to defend a client who does not have a
meritorious claim to actual innocence. 24 The representation is based
both on a valid claim of innocence and the client's assertion of actual
innocence. 25 Many projects use the "belief' criteria as a means to
determine whether to proceed with the case when both incriminating and
exculpatory evidence is present. 126 It is also used as a check to avoid
filing motions where the incriminating evidence heavily and clearly
outweighs the exculpatory evidence.127
IV.

THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM

Our adversarial system's elementary premise is that partisan
advocacy representation for both sides of a case will foster the goal of
justice: that the guilty are convicted and the innocent go free. 128 A
criminal trial is a fact-finding process. No aspect of advocacy is more
important than to marshal the evidence for each side before submission
of the case to judgment. The parties in the adversarial system are not the
decision-makers, although many enter the trial already decided. Should
either the prosecution or defense claim to know the truth or the
appropriate decision prior to a trial, justice is put at serious risk. The role
of both parties is to investigate the evidence and prepare it for trial. The
prosecutor is expected to be objective. 129 The concept of being
"completely objective" is, to some extent, a meaningless phrase. To be
100% objective is beyond any individual's capability in a complex
situation like a trial. To be entirely objective in this regard is not an
achievable task. However, all participants are capable of selfobservation, self-monitoring, and following the rules and procedures of
litigation. It is important to underline that the adversarial system itself
defines the role of each attorney participant. Each has a different role to
play in the legal drama that is a criminal trial. Those roles are predetermined and polarized. Consequently, it is clear that the structure of
the judicial system and the roles of the defense and the prosecution
strongly influence the pre-trial disposition of each attorney. IN How can
either the defense or prosecution exhibit the distanced objectivity toward
124. Suni, supranote 20, at 929.
125. Id.
126. See Medwed, supra note 20, at 1103-05.
127. See Suni, supra note 20, at 924-26.
128. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
129. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
837, 847-52 (2004).
130. See Orenstein, supra note 121, at 426-27.
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the case and oneself and at the same time fully fulfill their legal
responsibilities? The official doctrine for each discipline demands that
they resolve a paradox; they are asked to perform an impossible task.'3
It is human nature to make judgments and to speculate regarding the
guilt or innocence of the accused. Yet, under the current ethical
obligations, a prosecutor is directed to make a personal decision about
32
the defendant's guilt prior to trial or any of the adversarial process.
The ethical obligations of the prosecution and the voluntary guidelines
adopted by many innocence programs require the parties to ascertain
their opinion of the truth prior to the truth-finding process. 133 However,
the system of justice used in the United States relies on the well-tested
revealed by zealous arguments and debate
principle that the truth is best
34
by both sides of the issue.'
In the U.S. criminal justice system, the adversarial nature of the trial
is intended to reveal the truth. More specifically, in the courtroom, the
procedure of cross-examination is the most effective tool for disclosing
the truth. 135 The opportunity for cross-examination is protected by the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 136 It is through crossexamination that the believability of a witness' testimony is tested. 137 In
fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that cross-examination is the
"greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."' 38 Thus,
it is within the courtroom that the truth is revealed. Further, crossexamination is highly contingent on the performance of the lawyers
involved. Through the proper performance of a cross-examination testing
the veracity of a witness, a trial attorney has the unique ability to
uncover truth. Justice cannot be served when facts are inadequately
developed with direct testimony, when an attorney fails to conduct a
proper cross-examination, or when an attorney fails to call a witness

131.

See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL

JUSTICE PROSECUTION

FUNCTION & DEF.

FUNCTION 4-1.2 cmt. at 122 (1993); Zacharias, supra note 37, at 57-58.
132. See supra Part I.C.
II.B.
133. See supra Parts II.C.,
134. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) ("The paramount importance of vigorous
representation follows from the nature of our adversarial system of justice. This system is premised
on the well-tested principle that truth-as well as fairness-is best discovered by powerful
statements on both sides of the question.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the
ConfrontationClause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557, 586-88 (1988).
136. U.S. CONST. amend VI; Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987) ("The opportunity
for cross-examination, protected by the Confrontation Clause, is critical for ensuring the integrity of
the fact-finding process.").
137. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 (defining cross-examination as "the principal means by which the
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested").
138. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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because of a preconceived notion of the truth, formed prior to trial and
the truth-finding process. 39
PROBLEMS WITH ADOPTING
PERSONAL BELIEFS IN INNOCENCE OR GUILT
V.

"An adversary presentation [is] the only effective means for
combating [the] natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of
the familiar that which is not yet fully known. 4,40
A personal belief in the accused's guilt shifts the essential inquiry
away from the facts and evidence, and transfers the prosecutor's
attention to selecting incriminating evidence and overcoming any
defense evidence. 141 The same is true for the defense in limited
representation innocence projects. 142 When such defense projects
develop a personal belief in the client's innocence, especially prior to the
completion of case investigation, the project attorney routinely
experiences great difficulty accepting that her beliefs may be wrong.
When non-confirming facts or evidence arise, an attorney with a preexisting personal belief concerning guilt or innocence views such
information through a scripted veil of personal belief and is unable to
evaluate the evidence clearly. The result is a high risk of either
prosecuting an innocent person or, for innocence projects, failing to
litigate on behalf of an innocent client. The following cognitive biases
are frequently expressed when prosecutors develop personal beliefs in
prematurely
guilt prior to trial or when innocence program participants
143
innocence.
or
guilt
inmates'
regarding
acquire opinions
A.

CognitiveDissonance

Personal certainties, in the form of belief in innocence or guilt,
result in self-fulfilling prophecies. Invariably, when a prosecutor,
defense attorney, or any other individual embraces a personal certainty
or belief, she will unwittingly wish to confirm the truth of that

139. See, e.g., Dixon v. Snyder, 266 F.3d 693, 704-05 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that counsel was
deficient for failing to cross examine a witness); Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 216-17, 228 (2d
Cir. 2001) (holding that defense counsel's failure to prepare a defense and call certain witnesses
prejudiced the defendant).
140. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958).
141. Burke, supra note 13, at 91-92.
142. See Orenstein, supranote 121, at 425-27.
143. See infra Part V.
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certainty. 144 In other words, she will construct the truth of her belief
merely by virtue of her belief and her certainty. How the attorney
reduces the dissonance is important.
"Cognitive dissonance" is a psychological state of mind that creates
conflict resulting from incongruous beliefs and external behavior. 4' This
cognitive state is naturally uncomfortable and leads the individual to
resolve the conflict. Resolution of cognitive dissonance is one form of
bias that occurs when a prosecutor (or any human) adopts a personal
certainty or a belief prematurely. Studies demonstrate that individuals
endeavor to reconcile their beliefs to conform to their behavior. 146
Therefore, because prosecutors most often proceed to prosecute cases
even when they harbor doubts regarding the defendant's guilt, 147 the
prosecutor will "cling to the theory of guilt" in order to reduce the
cognitive dissonance. 48 Cognitive dissonance creates a resilient hurdle
to accepting any doubts regarding the defendant's guilt. This is also true
at the post-conviction level. Even when presented with uncontroverted
routinely and
DNA evidence indicating absolute innocence, prosecutors
149
guilty.
are
defendants
that
maintain
inexplicably
B. Selective Information Processing
When a personal belief is strongly held, the individuals will
naturally protect themselves from information that is in conflict with that
search-and-recall
demonstrate
belief. Specifically, prosecutors
preferences for information that tends to confirm their belief of guilt, and
"they also tend to devalue disconfirming evidence, even when presented
with it." 15 This phenomenon is known as "selective information
processing,"' 5' and results in "people weigh[ing] evidence that
supports their152prior beliefs more heavily than evidence that contradicts
their beliefs."'

144. Alafair S.Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1587, 1594 (2006).
145. Orenstein, supra note 121, at 426; see also Burke, supra note 144, at 1596-99, 1601
effect on the interpretation
(discussing the phenomenon of selective information processing and its
of evidence, the resulting natural corrective measures people make to avoid the cognitive
dissonance).
146. See Burke, supra note 144, at 1601-02. 0
147. See Burke, supra note 13, at 86-91; Pecker, supra note 75, at1617-18.
148. Burke, supra note 144, at 1612-13.
149. Id.at1606, 1606 & n.l11,1612-13.
150. Id.at 1597.
151. Id.at 1596-99.
152. Id.at 1597.
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C. ConfirmationBias
Confirmation bias occurs when the individual is inclined to interpret
facts and evidence to support her belief, regardless of the nature of the
evidence. For example, if a prosecutor firmly believes that a defendant is
guilty of a rape, but no semen was found, then the prosecutor will likely
make the inference that the defendant wore a condom. Conversely, if in
the same case the prosecutor were convinced that the defendant is
innocent of the rape, the prosecutor would likely interpret the fact that no
semen was found as highly exculpatory evidence and conclude that the
defendant did not penetrate the alleged victim. The same evidence can be
seen as having two vastly different meanings. Two different beliefs can
different results for an accused individual with
cause two dramatically
153
the same evidence.

D. Tunnel Vision
Tunnel vision, viewed as a subset of confirmation bias, occurs when
an individual tends to disregard or minimize facts or evidence that do not
support her belief or vision of the truth. 154 Tunnel vision naturally occurs
as a consequence of an individual belief. It is a subtle and natural human
tendency. Tunnel vision explains how once the police identify one
suspect, contradictory evidence is dismissed or minimized. 155 Tunnel
vision is at work when both police and prosecutors focus only on one
suspect or defendant while "building a case" for prosecution.
Exculpatory evidence may be ignored, and other possible culprits
may not be investigated or considered. This is true even when the
prosecution is directly presented with other plausible suspects or with
exculpatory evidence.
E. Belief Perseverance
Belief perseverance defines "the tendency to adhere to theories even
when new information wholly discredits the theory's evidentiary
basis."' 156 This occurs, as in the above example, when a prosecutor is
153. Orenstein, supra note 121, at 425-26.
154. Burke, supra 144, at 1604-05; Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291, 292, 307-08 (2006);

Orenstein, supra note 12 1, at 426.
155.

See Findley& Scott, supra note 154, at 315-16.

156. See Burke, supra note 144, at 1599. With belief perseverance, human cognition departs
from perfectly rational decision making not through biased assimilation of ambiguous new
information, but by failing to adjust beliefs in response to proof that prior information was
demonstrably false. Id.
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confronted with DNA proof that reveals that the defendant could not be
guilty. 157 When provided with similar DNA evidence, one prosecutor
stated: "I have no scientific basis. I know because I trust my detective
and my tape-recorded confession. Therefore, the results must be flawed
until someone proves to me otherwise."' 5 8
VI.

POST-CONVICTION

An attorney's belief in innocence or guilt is firmly rooted by the
post-conviction stage. Further ethical issues subsequently arise.
A. ProsecutionAdherence to Belief in Guilt
Prosecutors are seldom quick to admit when an accused has been
wrongfully convicted. Accepting that the wrong person has been
imprisoned is so painful, and so at odds with the prosecutor's core selfimage, that truth must be denied or, at least, minimized. Further
explained here:
Whether [a] conviction was obtained through a jury verdict or the
defendant's own guilty plea, [a] prosecutor will view [a] conviction as
further evidence confirming the accuracy of her initial theory of guilt.
A prosecutor's strengthened belief in her theory will continue to taint
her analysis of any new evidence ....
...The conviction of an innocent person is inconsistent with the
ethical prosecutor's belief that charges
should be brought only against
59
guilty.1
actually
are
who
suspects
To avoid cognitive dissonance, the prosecutor must maintain a theory of
guilt post-conviction, no matter what exculpatory evidence she faces.
Post-conviction, if she agrees that the inmate is innocent, she must
accept responsibility for the conviction of an innocent person.
Vii.

ETHICAL "BELIEF" STANDARDS CONTRIBUTE

TO WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
This Article suggests that pre-trial personal belief in an accused's
guilt or innocence, on behalf of the prosecutor or defense attorney, leads

157. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
158. Sara Rimer, Convict's DNA Sways Labs, Not a Determined Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 6, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/06/us/convict-s-dna-sways-labs-not-a-determinedprosecutor.html.
159. Burke, supra note 144, at 1612-13 (footnotes omitted).
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to biased decision-making and investigations.1 60 However, it does not
necessarily follow that an attorney's beliefs or biases are always wrong
and result in wrongful convictions. Nevertheless, a careful appraisal of
the circumstances indicates that a "belief' requirement necessarily leads
to biased outcomes. Certainly, the prosecution will often be correct,
perhaps even the majority of the time. However, given the staggering
number of exonerations that are coming to light, 16 1 and the troubling
statistics indicating extensive racism and discrimination in the justice
system,1 62 the only sensible conclusion is that the wide discretion that the
"belief' standard provides attorneys is a contributor. 163
A.

Ethical "Belief"StandardsAllow for Racial Bias in
Attorney Decision Making and Investigation

It is evident that bias resulting from prejudice and discrimination
still exists in the criminal justice system. Without doubt, much of this
bias is unintentional.1 64 Irrespective of intentions, the flaws and the
fissures, through which prejudice seeps into the system of justice, must
be found and sealed. The low evidentiary standard of probable cause,
and the wide discretion accompanied by the individual belief standard
held by prosecutors (and some defense attorneys), provide an unlocked
door, easily opened for inadvertent and deliberate discrimination and
bigotry. As discussed above, the relevant rules of ethical conduct for
prosecutors offer no formulae on which the attorney must base her
beliefs. 165 A prosecutor is not required to justify her beliefs. In fact, a
prosecutor must cease prosecution of a case if she believes the defendant
is innocent, irrespective of the state of the evidence. 166 This necessarily
results in the conclusion that a prosecutor may hold a valid and
reasonable belief regarding a67 defendant's guilt or innocence irrespective
of the state of the evidence.'
160. See supra Parts I.C-llI.B.
161.

See National Registry of Exonerations, U. MICH. L. SCH., https://www.law.umich.edu/

special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) ("Detailed View" subpage).
162. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
available at
7
(2013),
TABLES
STATISTICAL
2009
COUNTIES,
URBAN
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf.
163. See Rodriguez & Ryave, supra note 3, at 22.
COMMISSION,
KENNEDY
JUSTICE
164. See
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ABA HOUSE OF

AM.
BAR
DELEGATES

WITH
ASS'N, REPORTS
54 (2004), available at

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminaljusticesection-newsletter/crimju
st-kennedyJusticeKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.authcheckdam.pdf.
165. See supra Part l.D.
166. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2014); Burke, supranote 13, at 83-85.
167. See John Kaplan, The ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 174, 178
(stating that "regardless of the strength of the case," prosecutors should not file charges unless they
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B. Ethical "Belief" StandardsResult in Racial Bias
168
Just as in 1972, when the Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia,
overturned a number of death sentences for being discriminatorily
applied, the poor and minority are still overwhelmingly sentenced to
death today. 169 Racial bias pervades not only death penalty sentencing,
but also the justice system generally. 170 Recent statistical analyses of the
demographics of criminal defendants show that racial and gender
prejudice still exists in the justice system. 17 1 A 2009 study of charges and
arrests for serious felonies in the seventy-five largest counties in the
United States shows a strong prejudice against minoritiesapproximately1 2seventy percent of the defendants charged were classified
as minorities.
Because more than ninety percent of criminal cases never reach
trial, an analysis of plea-bargaining is a helpful indicator of bias and
prejudice in the system. 173 Sadly, there is widespread belief amongst the
members of the legal community that whites get favorable treatment in
plea-bargaining compared to minorities. 174 The same trend can also be
seen in recent sentencing and conviction rates. In a compilation of
several studies analyzing state-level data to produce estimates of the
"effect of race on sentence severity," 43.2% of estimates suggested more
severe sentences for blacks, and 27.6% suggested harsher sentences for
Latinos.175 In a similar compilation using studies based on federal-level
data, over 68.2% of estimates suggested harsher sentences for blacks,
and 47.6% suggested harsher sentences for Latinos. 176 Generally,
"actually believe" that the defendant committed the crime and that it is "morally wrong" to continue
to prosecute unless "personally convinced" of such).
168. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
169. See id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); Bedau, supra note 23, at 619; Karen F. Parker
et al., Race, the Death Penalty,and Wrongful Convictions, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2003, at 48,49-51.
170. See Marc Mauer, Justicefor All? Challenging Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice
System, HUM. RTS., Fall 2010, at 14, 14-15; Parker et al., supranote 169, at 49-50.
171. REAVES, supranote 162, at 5-7.
172. Id. at 7, tbl.5.
173.

MINN. SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL Sys., FINAL

REPORT 28 (1993) [hereinafter MINN. SUPREME COURT], available at http://www.mncourts.gov/
documents/0/Public/Court-Information-Office/Race-Bias-Report-Complete.pdf; see Erica Goode,
Stronger Hand for Judges in the 'Bazaar' of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-after-rulings-on-pleadeals.html;
Pat Vaughan Tremmel, Much CelebratedAmerican Trial is Dying in Real Life, NORTHWESTERN U.
(Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.northwestem.edu/newscenter/ stories/2009/03/bumstrial.html.
174. See MINN. SUPREME COURT, supra note 173, at 28.
175. Cassia C. Spohn, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral
Sentencing Process, in 3 CRIM. JUST. 2000, at 455, 456 exhibit 2 (2000), available at
http://www.justicestudies.com/pubs/livelink3-I .pdf.
176. Id. at 455, 456 exhibit 2.
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statistics on length of imprisonment suggest blacks are "more likely
being disadvantaged as compared to similarly-situated whites.' 77
to whites, with
Latinos face a similar disadvantage, when compared
178
level.
federal
the
at
incarcerate
to
decisions
to
regard
The bias in the criminal justice system may be most evident in an
evaluation of the death penalty. The following quote reviews the widely
known Baldus study:
In 1983, over a decade after Furman [was decided], a group of
researchers performed a study to assess potential bias in the Georgia
death penalty system. This study has come to be known as the Baldus
study. Its findings were unmistakable, in that death sentences were
being given in a highly prejudiced manner. The study found that black
defendants who kill white victims have a much greater chance of being
given the death penalty than do white defendants that kill black victims
with generally equal mitigators and aggravators. Further, more than
twenty independent studies around the nation, as recently as 2008, have
reached similar conclusions....
Why is this discrepancy still occurring? ... [P]rejudices [can act as

biases and] are often learned and incorporated... into a person's
behavior [at a very young age]. Unconscious bias and prejudice are the
most dangerous types of error because they are outside the person's
awareness and therefore not available for attempts at conscious control
and modification. Similarly, when confronted with [the incarceration
or] the termination of a human's life, each [juror, prosecutor, or
defense attorney] is prone, at least in part, to react in a highly personal
and sometimes biased manner. 179
The ethical duties that a prosecutor must grapple with necessarily
encourage bias in her prosecuting or sentencing recommendation
decision. This personal decision making "provides a fertile ground" for
the prosecutor's investigation and fact presentation "to reflect personal
bias," which likely explains the Baldus Study and other similar studies'
results.180 The "lack of parameters and specific guidelines" available to
prosecutors "leaves room for prejudicial decision-making."' 18' There are
numerous sources with definitions for "prejudice," but it is often
177.

TUSHAR KANSAL, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITY IN SENTENCING: A

available at
ed.,
2005),
Mauer
5
(Marc
LITERATURE
OF THE
REVIEW
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rdsentencing review.pdf.
178. IdI
179. Sarah A. Mourer, Forgetting Furman: Arbitrary Death Penalty Sentencing Schemes
Across the Nation, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1183, 1202-03 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
180. Id. at 1303.
181. Id.0

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1087

described "as a sentiment that lacks adequate factual information to
support a conclusion; 82 an uninformed decision based on
1
personal preconceptions."'
C. Ethical "Belief"Standards Lead to
Racial Biases that Result in Wrongful Convictions
Biases held by prosecutors about race and gender can pose a
particularly dangerous threat. At the time of this writing, the Innocence
Project lists 330 post-conviction DNA exonerations in United States
history. 183 However, DNA exonerations only depict a small percentage
of the actual wrongful convictions. 184 In addition, not all potential
candidates are actually tested. Many accused who pled guilty or "no
contest" to a crime are not eligible for DNA testing even if biological
185
evidence exists.
The National Registry of Exonerations, a joint project of the
University of Michigan Law School and the Center on Wrongful
Convictions at Northwestern University School of Law, which tracks
and provides information for all exonerations in the United States since
1989, lists a current total of 1652 exonerations for both DNA and nonDNA exonerations. 186 Of those exonerated between 1989 and December
2013, ninety-two percent were men, approximately sixty percent
187
identified as racial or ethnic minorities, and eleven percent pled guilty.
Contributing factors, of which there can be more than one, to the
wrongful convictions in the original cases include: perjury or false
accusation (fifty-six percent); official misconduct (forty-six percent);
mistaken witness identification (thirty-eight percent); false or misleading
forensic evidence (twenty-two percent); and false confessions (twelve
182. Id."'Prejudice' is defined from many sources as an opinion or decision made without
sufficient knowledge or factual basis." Id.at 1203 n.169 (citing Prejudice, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prejudice (last visited Sept. 2, 2015); Prejudice, FREE
DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/prejudice (last visited Sept. 2, 2015)).
183. The
Cases:
DNA
Exoneree
Profiles,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/front-page#cl O=published&b-start-0&
c4=Exonerated+by+DNA (last visited Sept. 2,2015).
184. See Comments of the Florida Innocence Initiative, Inc. at 5, In re Amendments to Fla.
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853(D), 938 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2006) (No. SC05-1702). In Florida, for
example, only ten percent of felony cases involve biological evidence that could be utilized for
testing. Id.

185. Justin Brooks & Alexander Simpson, Blood Sugar Sex Magik: A Review of Postconviction
DNA Testing Statutes and Legislative Recommendations, 59 DRAKE L. REv. 799, 860-61 (2011).
186. National Registry of Exonerations, U. MICH. L. SCH., https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) ("About Us" main page).
187.

NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2013, at 9 (2014), available at

https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations in 2013_Report.pdf.
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percent).1 88 Strikingly,
the exonerees were imprisoned for an average of
89

ten years each.1
However, available figures regarding exonerations reflect only a
small fraction of wrongful convictions and innocent individuals currently
jailed. 190 Many experts estimate that wrongful convictions may amount
to as many as five percent of all convictions in the United States. 19 1 To
put this in perspective, in 2005 the number of convicted individuals92
imprisoned in state or federal prison totaled approximately 1.4 million. 1

By these estimates, a staggering 70,000 of these inmates were innocent.
Even conservative estimates approximate roughly 10,000 wrongful
convictions per year. 193 Still, even greater numbers of innocent
people
194

are arrested "and prosecuted, though ultimately not convicted."'
VIII.

PROBLEMS FOR PROSECUTORS TO SEEK JUSTICE

AND MAINTAIN COMMUNITY FAITH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

Part of the prosecution's obligation to seek justice is a duty to
protect the public's faith in the jury system.' 95 Frequently, the concept of
achieving a just result will be in conflict with supporting the public's
faith in the judicial system. 196 An obligation to satisfy the public is often
independent of securing justice.' 97 The concept of justice is often
polemic and highly individualized. 98 Accordingly, justice is often
unpopular. The community's sentiment about justice may not change

even when an outcome is the just outcome. There is no necessary
relationship between what the community feels would be just and what
was actually achieved by the court and jury process. The prosecutor

cannot predict the public's opinion toward the outcome of any particular

188. Id. at 17 tbl.6.
189. Id. at 9.
190. See Beth Schwartzapfel & Hannah Levintova, How Many Innocent PeopleAre in Prison?,
MOTHERJONES (Dec. 12, 2011, 11:10 AM), http://www.mothejones.com/politics/2011/12/innocentpeople-us-prisons.
191. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL 77 (3d ed. 1997).
192. JAMES J. STEPHAN, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES, 2005, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csfcf05.pdf
193. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 191, at 77. Although some believe as many as five percent
of all convictions may be wrongful, using a conservative estimate of six tenths of one percent would
result in over 10,000 wrongful convictions a year. Id.
194. Sarah Anne Mourer, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Procedures Under the Fourth
Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 49, 54 (2008).
195. See Galin, supranote 7, at 1264-66.
196. Fuller & Randall, supra note 140, at 1218.
197. See Arvie, supra note 83, at 189.
198. Galin, supranote 7, at 1266-67.
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case or the long-term effect of that outcome on the public's faith in the
justice system.
The adversarial system was designed to seek truth and justice.'99
The notion that the public will maintain their faith in the adversarial
system if prosecutors use the public's opinion as a mere guide as
opposed to a moral compass is illogical. Any confidence the public has
in the criminal justice system can only be maintained if the system
functions effectively. Yet, the public must have a fundamental faith in
the justice system before it can function properly.20 0 If the criminal
justice system does not have the confidence and support of the
community, jurors, as representatives of the public, will not fulfill their
role seriously and with enthusiasm.
Is it improper to place the burden of maintaining public confidence
on the prosecution alone? Not only is such a burden impossible, but the
responsibility to ensure that the community continues to embrace the
justice system lies in the hands of all who labor within it, from bailiffs to
judges. This responsibility requires each individual to conduct
themselves ethically and within the rules of their jurisdiction. Should
such a criminal justice utopia occur, presumably the public would
maintain strong support and faith in the system because it would function
as it was meant to function.
Nonetheless, no feasible system, no matter how flawlessly
administered, would produce fair and just results every time. This is not
possible, primarily because the justice system relies on human beings to
achieve fairness and justice. It is impossible to remove all human error
from any complex legal procedure, like a trial. Bias and fixed
predispositions cannot be entirely removed from any system or
organization. 20 ' Accordingly, even a constitutionally 2 faultless
trial may
2
convict an innocent person, or exonerate a guilty one. 0
199. Robert Gilbert Johnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary System as a Means of Seeking
Truth and Justice,35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 147, 154 (2002).
200. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal
Procedure: The Case ofAlford andNolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1361, 1387 (2003)
("Public confidence and faith in the justice system are essential to the law's democratic legitimacy,
moral force, and popular obedience."); H. Patrick Furman, Wrongful Convictions and the Accuracy
of the Criminal Justice System, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2003, at 11, 25 ("In 1789, the first year of
constitutional governance of this country, George Washington wrote that he was convinced 'the due
administration ofjustice is the firmest pillar of good government.' If people lose faith in the criminal
justice system, society is greatly weakened.") (footnotes omitted).
201. See Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78 S.CAL. L. REV. 181, 185-86 (2004) ("No
conceivable system of procedure can guarantee perfect accuracy.").
202. See L. Darnell Weeden, Introduction: Race & Immigration Symposium, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1, 2 (2012) ("An American criminal justice system that is unequal and practices racial bias violates
the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause requirement for fairness and that of the Equal
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DC.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given that confirmation bias, selective information processing, and
belief perseverance function largely at an unconscious level, these types
of biases are particularly challenging to eliminate or reduce. °3 Further
escalating the challenge is the quality and nature of human certainty.
Studies in human behavioral psychology show that certainty-the
feeling of being "sure"-is simply a sensation that results from brain
mechanisms, which function independent of thought or reason.
Essentially, feelings of sureness and certainty are more closely related to
human emotion than an objective standard of truth. This realization
becomes exceptionally frightening when considering the obvious bias
and prejudice within the justice system in conjunction with the wide
discretion of the prosecutor. 0 Certainty of opinion, or belief, arises out
of involuntary brain functions like love or anger.20 6 Belief functions
independently from reason and, once adopted, loses capacity for
modification or flexibility. 20 7 Although humans feel that their beliefs and
certainties are choices based in reason, they are neither choices, nor even
rational thoughts.20 8
As discussed, the cognitive biases that result from cognitive
dissonance stemming from belief in guilt and innocence are largely
unconscious. 20 9 Hence, the individual is unable to acknowledge any bias
or become aware of any other negative or discriminatory emotions or
feelings that may affect the individual's certainty and decision.21 0
Consequently, prosecutors and innocence projects that wish to impose
similar criteria must be provided concrete guidelines unrelated to beliefs,
emotions, or personal certainties when deciding whether or not to litigate
a case. Currently, prosecutors are only required to have probable cause to
proceed to trial. 21 1 This is an exceedingly low evidentiary standard,
Protection Clause for racial equality."); John W. Wesley, Note, Scientific Evidence and the Question
ofJudicial Capacity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 682 (1984) ("Impartiality is a function of due

process, and a system that furthers bias and prejudice on the part of the fact-finder violates due
process.").
203. See supra Part V.
204. ROBERT A. BURTON, ON BEING CERTAIN: BELIEVING YOU ARE RIGHT EVEN WHEN
YOU'RE NOT, at xi, 139 (2008).

205. See supra Parts II,
V.
206. BURTON, supra note 204, at xi.
207.

See id.at139.

208. See id.
at126-27, 139.
209. See supra Part V.
210. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Why Do Brady Violations Happen?: Cognitive Bias and Beyond,
NAT'L ASS'N CRIM. DEF. LAW., https://www.nacdl.org/champion.aspx?id=28470 (last visited Sept.

2,2015).
211. See supra Part ll.B.
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leaving much room for the prosecutor to allow herself to be guided by
her own emotions and biases in her litigation decision. 212 The
prosecution should be required to meet a much higher evidentiary burden
before advancing to trial. Furthermore, the prosecutor should consider all
known evidence when making the decision whether to prosecute, not
only admissible evidence. This is important if the prosecution is
attempting to only prosecute those who are in fact guilty. An
appropriate standard to be met before progressing to trial for the
prosecution might be:
A defendant may only be prosecuted for a crime for
which the prosecution obtains enough admissible
evidence such that a reasonable jury should find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the
prosecution may not prosecute any defendant if all of the
known facts and evidence (whether admissible or not)
introduced at trial would likely fail to result in a
conviction for the crime charged. A prosecutor must be
able to defend charging decision with facts and evidence
at all times.
Similarly, for post-conviction innocence projects, a reasonable
standard that should be met before filing a motion for post-conviction
relief might be:
The project [or applicable name of innocence program]
must obtain enough evidence such that, if admitted at a
retrial, it would more likely than not result in an
acquittal. The project should not continue representation
of the inmate if the introduction of all known facts and
evidence (whether admissible or not) would more likely
than not fail to result in an acquittal. The [name of
innocence program] must be able to defend its decision
to represent or not to represent the client at all times.
The revised standard for the prosecution substantially increases the
evidentiary standard that must be met before advancing to a trial. Under
this proposed requirement, the prosecutor would need to have enough
admissible evidence to convince a reasonable jury that the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and would need to make this
determination before proceeding to trial. The beyond a reasonable doubt
standard is the standard in criminal cases that prosecutors must meet at
212. See supra Part U.D.
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trial to obtain a conviction.21 3 Therefore, it makes little sense to allow
prosecutors to prosecute defendants with less evidence than that which
should convince a reasonable jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Certainly, most prosecutors will make this evidentiary assessment prior
to trial, but there is no mandate for them to do So. 2 14 The prosecution
does not want to lose the case and is unlikely to progress to trial with the
belief that she will lose the trial.
Recall, however, that under the current scheme, the prosecutor has a
firmly developed belief in the defendant's guilt. Further, she has
confirmed her belief in guilt through selective thought processing and
avoidance of cognitive dissonance. Consequently, her pre-trial review of
the evidence almost invariably will lead to the conclusion that a
reasonable jury should find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. With less than adequate evidence, a firmly convinced prosecutor,
and an often only marginally-competent defense attorney, it is simple to
see how a jury could be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt, and how
wrongful convictions occur, even in constitutionally error-free trials.
Furthermore, both of the revised standards require a review of all
facts and evidence, even if the known facts and evidence cannot be
viewed by the jury or fact-finder. The standards suggest that, although
certain evidence may be inadmissible at trial, all evidence should be
considered by the attorney in the course of his decision-making. For
example, imagine that a case with only one witness's identification of
the defendant needs to be considered for trial readiness by a prosecutor.
A review of the facts reveals that at an apartment complex in an
impoverished neighborhood known for gang activity, two known gang
members, Todd and Rod, were shot and killed. At the time of the
shootings, a substantial crowd had been loitering in the area. This
particular apartment complex is also known for drug activity and as a
hub for drug dealing in the area. The prosecutor is aware of the
apartment complex's connection to drugs and gangs, both through her
communications and relations with police officers who work that area,
and from prosecuting previous cases from that area. These facts are not
admissible in the instant case because although they may be probative
(relevant), their relevancy is outweighed by the prejudice they would
likely cause.21 5
Only one witness, Jimbo, from the large crowd at the complex,
came forward to state that he had seen the incident. Based on Jimbo's

213. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
214.
215.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2014).
SeeFED. R. EvtD.403.
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description, the defendant, Willis, was detained at the apartment
complex only minutes after the shooting. Jimbo identified Willis during
a show-up of Willis while still at the scene. A show-up occurs when only
one individual is presented to a witness for a potential identification. The
identification of Willis occurred while two officers detained Willis.
Willis was held up against a wall of the apartment complex. He was
clearly attempting to flee. Jimbo quickly stated: "That's him! He shot
Todd." Jimbo stated that Willis did not shoot the other victim, Rod. The
defendant was hurriedly placed in the back of a police car. When officers
initially arrived at the complex, Todd was already dead, but Rod was still
alive, although he was shot in the chest. Paramedics worked frantically
to save him. Moments before Rod died at the scene, he gasped to the
paramedics that Willis did not shoot Todd but that Jimbo shot Todd, and
Willis did not do anything. Rod's statement cannot be admitted into
evidence as a dying declaration hearsay exception because it does not
relate to the circumstances surrounding his own death, but rather the
death of Todd.216 Yet, the prosecution must consider this fact even if it
cannot be presented to the jury, as it remains relevant to the issue of
Willis' guilt. 217 If the jury heard Rod's statement in combination with a
suggestive yet admissible identification would they convict? In the
interest of justice, and in the interest of maintaining the community's
faith in the justice system, it would be deemed fair and equitable that the
prosecutor consider the likelihood of a conviction if the jury knew that
Rod might have testified that Jimbo shot Todd and that Willis was
not involved.
X.

CONCLUSION

The adversarial system is designed to uncover the truth.218
Consequently, the courtroom motto does not say, "We Here Already
Know the Truth." If an adversary adopts a personal belief regarding guilt
or innocence prior to trial, it obscures the truth-seeking objective.21 9 The
result of this pre-trial belief can, and does, lead to wrongful
convictions. 22 0 The truth-finding objective of the justice system is,
therefore, never served by pre-judgnents in any legal context. 2 Once a
prosecuting attorney adopts the belief that the defendant is guilty or
innocent, this pre-judgment notion influences the way the individual
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See FED. R. EViD. 804(b)(2).
SeeFED. R. EViD. 401. 0
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part VII.
See supra Part IV.
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views facts, evidence, the defendant, and all information associated with
the case.222 This bias or "truth" wires itself into the attorney's cognitive
functioning and impacts how the prosecutor or defense attorney views
any possibly exculpatory evidence as the case progresses.223 Any
exculpatory evidence will be immediately viewed as false. As a result of
the prosecutor's predisposition to view all facts and evidence as
indicating guilt, the prosecutor is no longer seeking justice, but rather is
seeking a conviction.
The proposed standards may be a step in the right direction.
Nonetheless, defense attorneys and prosecutors will still need to make
judgments and decide if they believe a jury will convict or acquit. The
fundamental distinction between the current mandate and this Article's
proposed standards is that, currently, a prosecutor's belief in the
defendant's guilt need not be based on facts or evidence exceeding the
baseline standard of probable cause.224 Thus, every prosecutor's
unconscious bias, even racial and discriminatory bias, is invited to come
out and demolish the prosecution's good intentions. A revised standard
with higher evidentiary requirements provides a foundation for the
prosecutor's conclusions and locks the door in an attempt to keep those
racial or discriminatory biases locked up in the attic.

222.
223.
224.

See supra Part V.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part ll.B.
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